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REGULATING THE PRIVATIZED SECURITY INDUSTRY:
THE PROMISE OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
Laura A. Dickinson*
As governments around the world increasingly turn to contractors to
provide government services in the sphere of military and foreign affairs,
significant problems of accountability arise. Traditional public governmental
mechanisms of regulation and accountability, as well as accountability through
litigation, are often inadequate or unavailable. International legal instruments
similarly offer only minimal enforcement of human rights or other publicregarding norms, and in any event they may not always apply to nonstate
actors. As a result, we must find new forms of public/private governance and
oversight in this rapidly expanding area of military and quasi-military
operations.
The widespread role of contractors in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
highlights these challenges.1 At many times during these conflicts, the ratio of
contractors to troops hovered around one to one, reflecting a huge shift in the
way the U.S. government projects its power overseas.2 As the Commission for
Wartime Contracting has documented, the U.S. government increased the use
of contractors at the same time that it radically reduced the number of
contracting oversight personnel, weakening the kind of managerial oversight
that can help prevent abuses.3 Although many contractors performed their jobs
admirably—and indeed many gave their lives in what is a generally untold
story of sacrifice during these wars—when some did commit abuses there were
very few workable accountability mechanisms on the back end.4 The
* Oswald Symister Colclough Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University School of
Law. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the Randolph W. Thrower Symposium at Emory Law
School, February 2013, and at workshops held at Cornell Law School and at American University Washington
College of Law. My thanks to participants at all three events for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF
PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1–22 (2011).
2 See id. at 1–40.
3 COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., DEFENSE AGENCIES MUST IMPROVE THEIR
OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTOR BUSINESS SYSTEMS TO REDUCE WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE 7 (2009), available
at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929221533/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC
_SR1_business-systems_2009-09-21.pdf.
4 See Daphne Eviatar, 3 Years After Blackwater Massacre in Iraq, Contractors Still Lack Accountability
and Oversight, DAILY KOS (Sept. 16, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/09/16/902433/-3-
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debarment system5 is notoriously ineffectual,6 and criminal cases have often
stalled due to botched evidence-gathering, jurisdictional gaps, and other
problems.7
In my own work, I have long argued that, to the extent that we care about
ensuring that contractors respect core public values such as human rights, we
should look toward new modes of accountability and constraint to protect those
values.8 In particular, the human rights community has sometimes tended to
focus on the creation of new treaties to address nongovernmental actors, or
they have limited their vision to tackling governmental misconduct rather than
misconduct by private contractors. While such efforts are tremendously
important, I have suggested that there are other innovative accountability
mechanisms that are equally (if not more) important, such as reforming the

Years-After-Blackwater-Massacre-in-Iraq-Contractors-Still-Lack-Accountability-and-Oversight; see also
JENNIFER K. ELSEA & NINA M. SERAFINO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32419, PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 23 (2007), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470189.
5 The U.S. government uses the suspension and debarment system to protect its interests from bad actors
performing U.S. government contracts. FAR 9.402(b) (2012). Except in compelling circumstances, see id.
9.405(a), 9.405-1(a), a contractor who is suspended or debarred is prohibited from obtaining future federal
government contracts. Id. 9.405(a). Suspensions and debarments in the United States arise from either an
agency’s discretionary decision, id. 9.406-2, a statutory mandate, or, in some instances, an agency’s de facto
action. Agency officials may impose discretionary suspensions and debarments after a finding of wrongdoing
such as fraud, bribery, making false statements, or repeated performance failures. See, e.g., id. 9.406-2(a)(3)
(providing for debarment for making false statements); id. 9.406-2(b)(1)(i)(B) (providing for debarment for
repeated performance failures); see also id. 9.406-2(b)(1) (referring to Pub. L. No. 100–690, § 102 Stat. 4181
(1988) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 701–707 (2006))) (providing for discretionary debarment for
drug use). Statutory suspension and debarments are automatic sanctions arising from violations of certain laws,
sometimes resulting in an indictment or conviction. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2408(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting any
individual convicted of fraud or felonies arising out of a contract with the Department of Defense from
involvement with future defense contracts); 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2012) (prohibiting, with limited exception, drug
trafficking convicts from receiving federal benefits, including federal contracts); 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (2006)
(setting forth environmental water standards); 2 C.F.R. § 1532.1100 (2013) (laying out the agency’s
accompanying suspension and debarment regulatory administration). De facto debarments arise when an
agency blacklists a contractor, either pursuant to a particular law, see, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 841(a)(1)(A), 125 Stat. 1298, 1510 (2011) (“Prohibition on
Contracting with the Enemy in the United States Central Command Theater of Operations”), or through a
permanent finding that a contractor is nonresponsible, see, e.g., MG Altus Apache Co. v. United States, 111
Fed. Cl. 425, 451 (2013) (finding that the agency’s permanent finding that a contractor was nonresponsible,
resulting in blacklisting of the contractor, was reasonable).
6 COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., supra note 3.
7 See DICKINSON, supra note 1, at 43.
8 See, e.g., id., at 39.
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terms of the contracts themselves, developing codes of conduct, and building a
variety of governmental and nongovernmental accreditation regimes.9
Now, we have a promising example pushing in some of these new
directions. The human rights community, partnering with industry and
government, has produced a voluntary International Code of Conduct for
Private Security Service Providers (hereinafter “ICoC” or “the Code”),10 along
with a proposed governance and oversight mechanism in order to enforce the
Code.11 Both the Code and oversight mechanism are the product of many years
of dedicated work by what may seem to be an unlikely partnership of actors in
a strikingly open and transparent process.12 The resulting mechanism has yet to
take effect, but its parameters are sufficiently established that a preliminary
evaluation is appropriate.13
In this Article, I first describe the development of both the Code and its
accompanying oversight mechanism as well as some of the key features of this
regime. Then, I evaluate the emerging regime and its potential to reflect and
promote core public values. Such values include, substantively, the values of
human dignity embedded in human rights and humanitarian law, as well as the
procedural values of global administrative law: public participation,
transparency, and accountability. And I will examine both the process by
which this regime was created and the substantive terms and enforcement
mechanism of the regime itself. In the end, although we will need to wait to see
how this Code is ultimately implemented and enforced, I conclude that it holds
a great deal of promise both as an accountability mechanism for private
military contractors and as a model for future public/private accountability
regimes. Significantly, as compared to other voluntary industry codes of

9 Id. at 40–68; see also Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors and Civil Liberty: Use of the
Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 365, 375–77 (2006).
10 INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS (2010),
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_
Names.pdf [hereinafter ICOC].
11 INT’L CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS’ ASS’N, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION
(2013), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_Association.pdf [hereinafter ARTICLES OF
ASSOCIATION].
12 See SWITZ. FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET: INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS 2 (2011), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Fact_Sheet_ICoC_
November_2011.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (noting that the ICoC process involved private security
companies, industry associations, governmental representatives, and various humanitarian and
nongovernmental organizations).
13 See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11.
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conduct, this regime creates the possibility for greater oversight,
accountability, and independent monitoring. Although it is too soon to tell
whether the ICoC framework will be effective in practice, it may, in time, offer
a useful roadmap for other industries where formal legal mechanisms are
insufficient.
I. THE ICOC REGIME
The ICoC regime began as an initiative of the Swiss government, in
partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to
respond to ambiguities regarding the applicability of international
humanitarian law (IHL) to contractors.14 The Swiss, who have a unique history
with the ICRC and feel a special obligation to promote and protect IHL,
convened a group of experts, government representatives, civil society groups,
and industry actors to consider the issues.15 A series of meetings and
conversations resulted in the Montreux Document, a statement of principles
that did not purport to be a new treaty, but rather derived principles from
existing treaties and applied them specifically to contractors.16
It became clear that more was needed, however, to provide guidance and
oversight to private security contractors, and so a further initiative to establish
an international code of conduct for the industry was launched. The Swiss
convinced the United States and the United Kingdom to work with leaders of
the private security industry and various human rights groups over a period of
several years to develop both a substantive code of conduct and a governance
mechanism to implement the code. The resulting drafting group, called the
“Association” for purposes of the ultimate Code, maintains ultimate authority
to implement the Code’s provisions.17
A. The ICoC’s Substantive Provisions
The Code itself is a strikingly detailed and comprehensive document that
explicitly applies key principles of human rights and humanitarian law to
14 See ICoC Timeline, INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS, http://www.icocpsp.org/ICoC_Timeline.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2013).
15 See The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, SWITZ. FED. DEP’T
FOREIGN AFF., http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/psechi.html (last visited Dec.
13, 2013).
16 See id.
17 See About the ICoC Association, INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS,
http://www.icoc-psp.org/ICoC_Association.html (last visited Dec 13, 2013).
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private security contractors. This is significant because the treaties from which
these principles are derived are often ambiguous about their applicability to
nongovernmental actors. As such, the ICoC fills important gaps in
international law without the need for a long and laborious treaty-revision
process. Instead, companies that sign on to the Code agree to respect these core
principles.18 Moreover, the Code spells out the companies’ obligations in
detail.19 And, beyond requiring companies simply to make normative
commitments, the Code goes further and obligates signatories to reform
particular organizational and procedural practices to implement the Code.20
An in-depth description of a few of these normative commitments gives a
flavor of the specificity and detail of the document. For example, the Code
clearly prohibits companies from engaging in excessive force, explicitly stating
that company personnel shall not “exceed what is strictly necessary, and
should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation.”21
Similarly, companies undertake to ensure that their personnel do “not use
firearms against persons except in self-defence or [in] defence of others against
the imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the perpetration of
a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life.”22 To the extent that
company personnel assist a government’s law-enforcement authority, signatory
companies agree to require personnel to comply with all applicable
international and domestic law and, at “a minimum, with the standards
expressed in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990).”23 As with other sections of
the Code, the use-of-force provisions cover situations involving armed conflict,
when international humanitarian law would ordinarily govern, as well as
during peacetime, when international human rights law would dominate.24
The prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment is
similarly precise. The Code does not speak to these terms directly, instead

18 ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 16 (“Signatory Companies agree to operate in accordance with the principles
contained in this Code.”).
19 See id. ¶¶ 28–43 (establishing general commitments of signatories to the Code and enumerating
specific principles regarding the conduct of personnel, including the use of force, detention, apprehension, and
sexual exploitation).
20 See id. ¶¶ 16–27.
21 Id. ¶ 30.
22 Id. ¶ 31.
23 Id. ¶ 32.
24 See id. ¶¶ 30–32.
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referencing current international law.25 However, the Code makes clear that,
“[f]or the avoidance of doubt, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, as referred to here, includes conduct by a private
entity which would constitute torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment if committed by a public official.”26 The Code further
elaborates that this obligation is non-derogable, emphasizing that
“[c]ontractual obligations, superior orders” or other “exceptional
circumstances,” such as armed conflict or other public emergencies, “can never
be a justification for engaging in torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”27
In addition, the Code devotes considerable attention to other violations of
human rights and humanitarian law. For example, companies agree to prohibit
their personnel from engaging in sexual exploitation and abuse, gender-based
violence, human trafficking, slavery, forced labor, child labor, and
discrimination.28 The Code also prohibits company personnel from engaging in
detention unless a government contract specifically allows it, and in any event
makes clear that all detainees must be treated humanely and in accord with the
international law applicable to their status.29 Finally, the Code makes clear that
company personnel may not “take or hold any persons except when
apprehending persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent
threat of violence, or following an attack or crime” against the company or
clients.30
Of course, as the history of bills of rights demonstrates, it is sometimes
easier to sign sweeping statements of principle than it is to build mechanisms
that will create actual enforcement on the ground. To that end, the ICoC goes
further, requiring companies not only to state their adherence to these
humanitarian and human rights norms, but also to make commitments
regarding internal management and governance to ensure implementation of
the Code. First, signatory companies undertake to incorporate the Code “into
Company policies and internal control and compliance systems and integrate it
into all relevant elements of their operations.”31 In addition, they make quite
25

Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 35.
27 Id. ¶ 36. In this regard, the Code goes further than some articulations of international law, which imply
that torture is non-derogable but that cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment may not be.
28 Id. ¶ 22.
29 Id. ¶ 33.
30 Id. ¶ 34.
31 Id. ¶ 44.
26
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specific commitments to engage in critical organizational practices and
procedures. For example, they commit to vet and train employees
extensively.32 As to vetting, notably, companies agree to “establish and
maintain internal policies and procedures to determine the suitability of
applicants, or Personnel, to carry weapons as part of their duties.”33 These
procedures include checks to ensure personnel have not been convicted of a
crime “that would indicate that the individual lacks the character and fitness to
perform security services” pursuant to the Code.34 The checks must also
establish that personnel or prospective personnel have not been dishonorably
discharged, had employment terminated for violations of one of the principles
contained in the Code, or had a history of other conduct that “brings into
question their fitness to carry a weapon.”35
As to training, companies agree to ensure that all personnel performing
security services are aware of the Code and relevant international and national
law.36 With respect to weapons training in particular, the Code provides that
companies must ensure that personnel carrying weapons have received
appropriate training for the specific weapon in question, that personnel receive
regular and recurrent training, and that the training includes specific instruction
on the rules regarding the use of force.37 The Code further extends these
requirements to subcontractors.38 Thus, companies that sign the Code agree
that if the subcontractor cannot fulfill the vetting and training requirements in
the Code, the primary contracting company “will take reasonable and
appropriate steps to ensure that all selection, vetting and training of
subcontractor’s Personnel is conducted in accordance with the principles
contained in this Code.”39 Relatedly, firms agree that the explicit terms of
contracts with individual employees contain key principles laid out in the
Code.40
32

Id. ¶¶ 45–49.
Id. ¶ 48.
34 Id. ¶ 48(a). The Code further lists specific disqualifying crimes: “battery, murder, arson, fraud, rape,
sexual abuse, organized crime, bribery, corruption, perjury, torture, kidnapping, drug trafficking or trafficking
in persons.” Id. ¶ 48.
35 Id. ¶ 48(d). In addition, companies agree to exercise general due diligence in employee selection,
id. ¶ 45; to refrain from hiring individuals under the age of eighteen to perform security functions, id. ¶ 46; and
to require applicants to authorize access to prior employment records. Id. ¶ 49.
36 Id. ¶ 55.
37 Id. ¶ 59.
38 Id. ¶ 51. The Code’s definition section includes subcontractors within the scope of “implementation.”
Id. § B.
39 Id. ¶ 51.
40 Id. ¶ 52.
33
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Other important provisions concern obligations to manage weapons41 and
the materiel of war42 responsibly, and to report certain Code violations.43 The
Code is particularly stringent in requiring signatory companies to prepare an
incident report “documenting any incident involving its Personnel that involves
the use of any weapon.”44 The report must include the time and location of the
incident, the identity and nationality of any persons involved, any injuries or
damage sustained, an account of the circumstances, and a description of
measures the company has taken in response.45 The report must be submitted
to the client and, where warranted, other competent authorities.46 Similarly, the
Code details reporting obligations in the case of torture or cruel treatment.47
Companies must require personnel to report any known or suspected “acts of
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” to the
client and competent authorities in either the host country or the country of
nationality of the victim or perpetrator.48
Finally, the Code obligates each signatory to establish internal grievance
procedures for both its own employees and third parties to invoke in cases of
alleged Code violations.49 This provision is somewhat vague as to precisely
what those procedures must be, but it does specify that “[p]rocedures must be
fair, accessible and offer effective remedies, including recommendations for
the prevention of recurrence.”50 The companies must post details on their
websites regarding how third parties can invoke the procedures, and they must
investigate allegations promptly, keep records of proceedings (which must be
turned over to competent authorities when appropriate), cooperate with official
investigations, and provide whistleblower protections for employees who
report in good faith.51 As with the prohibition against torture, these provisions
fill gaps in domestic U.S. law (and possibly the laws of other countries), which
tends not to protect whistleblowers from the private sector as vigorously as
governmental employees.

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. ¶¶ 56–58.
Id. ¶¶ 60–62.
Id. ¶ 63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id.
Id. ¶ 66.
Id. ¶ 67(a).
Id. ¶ 67(b)–(g).
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B. Enforcement of the ICoC
Although, as summarized above, the ICoC is normatively quite robust, it
does not contain a formal enforcement mechanism. Nevertheless, by signing
the Code, companies do affirm that they “have sufficient financial capacity in
place” to cover any liabilities for damages.52 And, significantly, they
acknowledge that the ICoC is merely the first step in the establishment of a
true oversight and governance regime. Indeed, by signing the Code, companies
agree that within eighteen months, the overall association of governmental and
nongovernmental stakeholders will “[e]stablish objective and measurable
standards for providing Security Services based upon this Code,” as well as
“[e]stablish external independent mechanisms for effective governance and
oversight.”53 Specifically, the companies commit to support the process for
creating a true oversight mechanism, and, once it is established, they agree to
“become certified by and submit to ongoing independent Auditing and
verification by that mechanism.”54
Obviously, the robustness of this oversight mechanism will be crucial to
the overall effectiveness of the Code as a whole. Therefore, it is worth taking
some time to consider how this mechanism will be created. The relevant
document that lays out the features of the governance and oversight
mechanism is the Charter for the Oversight Mechanism of the International
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, and it is now in its
finalized form.55 The Charter lays out four primary functions: (1) governance
of the mechanism itself; (2) certification of member companies; (3)
performance assessment of member companies through a combination of selfreporting, information from public and other available sources, and
independent monitoring; and (4) grievance processes.56 The final draft pulls
back from more robust language, contained in earlier drafts, specifying
independent performance assessment of companies in the field.57 But the
overall framework still allows for at least some independent monitoring of
companies on the ground and holds promise as a meaningful regime of
oversight and accountability.
52

Id. ¶ 69.
Id. ¶ 7.
54 Id. ¶ 8.
55 ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11.
56 Id.
57 Compare id. art. 11, with Second Draft of the Charter for the Oversight Mechanism of the International
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, art. 11 (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.icocpsp.org/uploads/ICoC_Draft_Articles_of_Association_January_30_-_final.pdf [hereinafter Second Draft].
53
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As to the first function, overarching governance authority rests not in the
overall Association, but in a twelve-member Board of Directors, with four
directors drawn from each constituency group: industry, government, and civil
society.58 The Charter lays out criteria and processes for entities from within
each constituency group to become members of the regime (although some of
these criteria and processes remain within the Board’s discretion to develop
after the regime is established).59 Entities from within each group then select
the Board members from that group.60 All members may participate in a
general meeting,61 but it is the Board of Directors that is the primary decisionmaker for the governance mechanism.62 The Board, which generally is to make
decisions by a majority of eight (including a minimum of two votes from each
stakeholder group), controls the budget, lays out procedures, and appoints an
Executive Director and Secretariat, who in turn oversee the day-to-day
operations of the governance regime.63
Second, the oversight mechanism is meant to govern the certification of
companies who have signed the Code. The Charter provides that independent
monitors, accredited by the Board, are to conduct a review to examine each
company’s systems and processes to make sure it is doing everything it said it
would do when it signed the Code.64 The precise certification requirements and
processes remain to be worked out by the Board.65 The Charter permits the
Board to rely on independent international standards if the Board recognizes
that the standards are consistent with the Code, and, at the same time, allows
the Board to specify “any additional information relevant to the human rights
and humanitarian impact of operations it deems necessary for assessing
whether a company’s systems and policies meet the requirements of the Code
and its readiness to participate in the Association.”66
This reference to outside standards is significant in part because of a
parallel effort, independent of the ICoC, to set standards for the industry
through the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, arts. 3.1, 7.2.
Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 7.2.
Id. art. 6.
Id. arts. 7.1, 8.
Id. arts. 7, 9.
See id. art. 12.
See id. art. 11.
Id. art. 11.2.1.
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International Standards Organization (ISO).67 One of the questions during the
development of the Charter has been to what extent these other certifications
would be sufficient to qualify a private security firm for certification under the
ICoC regime. Certainly, requiring companies to satisfy multiple certification
processes could be costly. However, if these other processes can simply
substitute for independent certification under the ICoC, it is unclear what bite
the ICoC will have, particularly if the substantive certification criteria of the
ICoC are in any respect more stringent than the alternatives. The Charter, in its
most recent draft, essentially punts on this question by leaving it up to the
Board to resolve.68 However, by suggesting that certification by another
standards organization could get a firm partway to ICoC certification,69 the
drafters of the Charter seem to be seeking to strike a compromise by
harnessing the efficiencies of certification through other organizations, while
allowing for additional requirements distinct to the ICoC certification regime.
Third, it is clear from the Charter that the Code is not simply a voluntary
self-regulatory system. Instead, the Charter envisions some degree of ongoing
independent evaluation of companies’ performance,70 although that function is
a bit less well-defined than it was in previous drafts.71 As in the case of
certification, the Charter charges the Board with developing additional
procedures.72 But the Charter itself lays out in broad strokes what process is
envisioned. The overall association of stakeholders is “responsible for
exercising oversight of Member companies’ performance under the Code,
including through external monitoring, reporting and a process to address
alleged violations of the code.”73 Member companies must provide the
Association with “a written assessment of their performance pursuant to a
transparent set of criteria covered by necessary confidentiality and
nondisclosure arrangements.”74 In addition to these self-assessments, “field
based review” may be authorized on the basis of “a human rights risk
assessment” in order to “assess the human rights impacts of company
67 See ASIS INT’L, ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012, MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR QUALITY OF PRIVATE SECURITY
COMPANY OPERATIONS—REQUIREMENTS WITH GUIDANCE, (2012), http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_vault/
Item_1997-PSC_1_STD.PDF.
68 ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 11.
69 Id. art. 11.2.1.
70 See id. art. 12 (enumerating various oversight procedures and providing that a method to address
violations of the Code shall be established).
71 See Second Draft, supra note 57, arts. 11, 12.
72 See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 12.2.
73 Id. art. 12.1.
74 Id. art. 12.2.2.
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operations.”75 These assessments are to be conducted by gathering information
from public sources such as clients, local authorities, affected communities,
and other relevant groups and individuals, using established human rights
methodologies.76 It remains unclear precisely who will conduct the “fieldbased review,” and much will depend on the efficacy of these types of on-theground assessments.
In response to the information gathered through these various means, the
Charter requires the Secretariat of the Association to engage in dialogue with
member companies to help improve performance of ICoC obligations both in
general and with respect to specific concerns.77 The Board is also charged with
reviewing performance and compliance issues, and may do so either at the
referral of the Executive Director or on its own initiative.78 In cases of
noncompliance with the ICoC, the Board may request a specific company to
take corrective action.79 If the company does not do so, the Board may impose
sanctions, which can include suspension or termination of membership.80 The
Charter requires the Association to publicly report, at least annually, on its
monitoring activities and, in general, to promote the objectives of Code
compliance.81
Finally, the Association is charged with facilitating the resolution of
grievances brought by company personnel or third parties.82 The Charter
provides that aggrieved individuals may submit claims to the Secretariat, and
the claims must contain specific allegations of conduct that would violate the
Code and allege harm to one or more claimants.83 The Charter requires the
Secretariat to inform the claimant of available fair and effective grievance
procedures, including those within the company in question.84 If the claimant
alleges that the company’s grievance mechanism is “not fair, not accessible,
[or] does not or cannot offer an effective remedy,” then the Secretariat itself
may review that allegation.85 If the Secretariat determines that the company’s

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. art. 12.2.3–.4.
See id. art. 12.2.1–.4.
Id. art. 12.2.5.
Id. art. 12.2.6.
Id. art. 12.2.7.
Id. arts. 12.2.7, 13.2.7.
Id. art. 12.3.
Id. art. 13.1.
Id. art. 13.2.1.
Id. art. 13.2.2.
Id. art. 13.2.3.
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grievance mechanism does not comply with the Code, the Secretariat may
recommend corrective action to the company and may refer the claim “to
another[] identified fair and accessible grievance procedure that may offer an
effective remedy.”86 The Board may also make such a recommendation, which
may include, specifically, “cooperation with the Association’s good offices,
the provision of a neutral and confidential mediation process, or other
arrangements that may assist the Member company to offer an effective
remedy as required by paragraphs 66 and 67 of the Code.”87 The Association
may not, however, impose specific awards.88 The Charter further requires that,
throughout the process, companies are “expected to cooperate in good faith,
consistent with applicable law and contractual requirements.”89 If the Board
determines that the company is not doing so, it may impose sanctions on the
firm, including suspension or expulsion from the Association.90
The Association’s role in facilitating grievances is perhaps the least welldeveloped aspect of the governance regime. For example, it is unclear
precisely what criteria the Board or Secretariat will use to determine whether a
company’s internal grievance process is adequate. As noted above, a claimant
may allege that a company’s grievance procedure is “not fair, not accessible,
[or] does not or cannot offer an effective remedy,” but this language is vague.91
The Code also states that the internal grievance process must include
“recommendations for the prevention of recurrence,” must “facilitate
reporting,” must “publish details” of the grievance process on a website, and
must “investigate allegations promptly, impartially and with due consideration
to confidentiality.”92 The Board will thus have a good deal of discretion in
determining precisely how the review of internal grievance mechanisms will
work and how stringent the application of these criteria will ultimately be.
Likewise, it is still unclear what kind of alternative grievance mechanism
the Board will recommend if it determines that a company lacks an effective
internal company process. Apart from general language that “[t]his may
include cooperation with the Association’s good offices, the provision of a
neutral and confidential mediation process, or other arrangements that may

86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. art. 13.2.4.
Id. art. 13.2.5.
Id.
Id. art. 13.2.7.
Id. arts. 12.2.7, 13.2.7.
Id. art. 13.2.3.
ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 67.
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assist the Member company to offer an effective remedy,” there is little
guidance for the Board.93 Mediation must be “neutral and confidential,” but
multiple types of mediation could be used, and it is also unclear who the
mediators will be or how they will be chosen.94 The language suggesting
“cooperation with the Association’s good offices” and “other arrangements” is
even less clear.95
A final lingering, open question is the relationship between any grievance
process and the official civil or criminal proceedings that may be available in
the host country, the client state, or the country of nationality of the victim or
alleged perpetrator. The Charter provides that the mere existence of parallel
proceedings does not necessarily suspend the ICoC’s grievance process, but
the Board is to consider such proceedings and retains the discretion to
“suspend or otherwise limit the complaints process as necessary and
appropriate in order to avoid serious prejudice to any such investigations or
proceedings or party thereto.”96
Certainly deference to parallel proceedings may sometimes be appropriate.
For example, in the case of the Baghdad Nisour Square shooting by
Blackwater guards working for the U.S. State Department, multiple
investigations by multiple governments and government agencies complicated
prosecutorial efforts by tainting evidence.97 Moreover, informal settlements
and mediation awards might interfere with civil litigation. In some U.S. tort
cases against contractors, for example, courts have suggested that remedies
outside the tort system, such as military compensation payments to victims
under the Foreign Claims Act, might strengthen the arguments for a broad
interpretation of contractor immunity and preemption doctrines.98
The ICoC and the Charter acknowledge these issues, signaling that the
Board and Association should be mindful of potential problems.99 And, of
course, it would be cause for concern if settlements through the ICoC process
were used to relieve a party of tort liability later. On the other hand, tort

93

ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 13.2.5.
Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. art. 13.2.10.
97 DICKINSON, supra note 1, at 55.
98 See, e.g., Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (identifying availability of alternative
compensation for victims under Foreign Claims Act as one rationale for broad approach to contractor
immunity and preemption doctrines that would preclude tort litigation).
99 ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 13.2.10.
94
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litigation has not so far been a particularly fruitful avenue of redress for
victims of contractor abuse overseas,100 and the ICoC grievance mechanisms
may prove to be a more effective remedy over time. But as with other key
aspects of the grievance facilitation process, both documents essentially leave
these questions to be resolved another day.
II. ANALYSIS
In order to examine the efficacy of the governance regime established by
the ICoC and the Charter, we need to analyze how well the regime seems to
reflect and protect core public values. Such values include both the
fundamental goals of public participation, transparency, and accountability
embodied in global administrative law, as well as the substantive humandignity values embodied in human rights and humanitarian law.101 Of course,
any analysis is tentative at this point because the regime is not yet
operational102 and, as discussed above, some important aspects of the
grievance process in particular remain to be fleshed out.103 Nevertheless, some
preliminary observations are possible. In this Part, I describe the core values I
believe we should use as metrics for analysis and then measure the ICoC
process and its substantive provisions against those metrics. I conclude that the
early indicators are promising, albeit preliminary, whether measured with
regard to the process for creating the ICoC regime or the substantive
provisions of the Code itself.
A. Core Public Values
For the purpose of this analysis, I have chosen to focus on a few core public
values, both procedural and substantive. First, we can analyze the ICoC with
regard to the values of public participation, transparency, and accountability,
the principal values of global administrative law. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico
Krisch, and Richard Stewart have argued that increased global interdependence
100 See, e.g., Saleh, 580 F.3d at 5 (adopting broad theory of federal preemption of tort claims arising on a
battlefield); Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown, & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2009)
(affirming the district court’s dismissal of the claim against a contractor on political question grounds). But see
Brent Kendall, Contractor’s Torture Settlement a Milestone: Payment of $5.28 Million at Abu Ghraib in Iraq
Underscores Legal Risk for Firms in War Zones, WALL STREET J., Jan. 10, 2013, at A7 (detailing a large
settlement between private military contractors and detainees abused at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq).
101 See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15, 16 (2005).
102 See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
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has spawned a global administrative space.104 They suggest that an
administrative law framework attuned to the global sphere might offer a means
of analyzing forms of transnational public and private power, and they suggest
that these three values lie at the core of this framework.105 Public participation,
which has long been a central preoccupation of administrative law, is perhaps
the most important value here. And significantly, the administrative law view
of public participation is not simply concerned with making sure a voting
polity ratifies all governmental decisions. Rather, it focuses on ensuring that
there is some sort of dialogue, even if informal, between the government and
the governed to act as a check on power and guard against the possibility of
capture by interest groups.
Public participation is particularly complex in the global, transnational
space. Of course, fundamental democratic principles would seem to dictate that
domestic publics should be permitted to participate in the decision-making of
their own governments. However, this simple idea is hard enough to effectuate
in the modern administrative state with regard to governmental actors.106
Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) itself, through its notice-andcomment process, was an overarching attempt to provide meaningful public
involvement in a new era in which legislatures had delegated multiple
activities to enormous administrative agencies.107 Yet critics have charged that
the APA framework does not afford meaningful participation. Public choice
scholars have long suggested that the framework allows agency capture by
narrow interests.108 And empirical studies have demonstrated that entities with
concentrated interests, such as certain sectors of industry, are more likely to
spur agency officials to change their policies.109 Indeed, it could be argued that
104

Kingsbury et al., supra note 101, at 26.
See id. at 29 (“The focus of the field of global administrative law is not, therefore, the specific content
of substantive rules, but rather the operation of existing or possible principles, procedural rules, review
mechanisms, and other mechanisms relating to transparency, participation, reasoned decisionmaking, and
assurance of legality in global governance.”).
106 See DICKINSON, supra note 1, at 102–44; Laura A. Dickinson, Privatization and Accountability, 7
ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 101, 117 (2011).
107 For a careful overview of the history leading to the enactment of the APA, see George B. Shepherd,
Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. L. REV.
1557, 1561–80 (1996).
108 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 513 (1988).
109 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 87–88 (2006) (finding that EPA
respondents found it likely that the White House “sought changes” that both reflected agency capture by
business interests and yet furthered the national interest).
105
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little meaningful input takes place through the formal structure at all and that
most of the relevant inputs occur before the formal notice-and-comment time
frame.110
But whatever the difficulties of administrative delegation to public
agencies, they are compounded when governments delegate important
functions to private contractors. This is, in a sense, a “double delegation” (from
legislator to agency to contractor) that tends to further reduce the spaces for
participation.111 And, when we are talking of governments (or contractors)
acting abroad, we have the additional question of whether such actors are in
any way obligated to provide foreign publics an opportunity to participate in
decision-making that affects them.112 Indeed, there is a robust debate about the
precise obligations of international institutions to offer opportunities for public
participation in their processes (beyond simply the involvement of
representatives from individual governments).113
For the purposes of this Article, I assume that the government that is
projecting its power overseas has some obligations to provide for participation
of its own citizens in the decisions regarding the projection of that power.
Perhaps more controversially, I also assume that some measure of public

110 See, e.g., Dorit Rubenstein Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking
Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 358 (2009) (arguing that the effectiveness of notice-andcomment procedures is in doubt because much of the meaningful work takes place before the procedures
begin).
111 See Paul R. Verkuil, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 23–25, 31, 46 (2007); Peter Lindseth, Agents
Without Principals? Delegation in an Age of Diffuse and Fragmented Governance, in REFRAMING SELFREGULATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 107, 108–09 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006); Gillian E. Metzger,
Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 291, 293 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
112 See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 419
(2006).
113 For example, Robert Dahl has suggested that public participation values are inevitably undermined by
delegations to international organizations, and therefore such delegations are only justified if the need for
interdependence and cooperation outweighs the loss of participation. Robert A. Dahl, Can International
Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY’S EDGES 19 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano HackerCordón eds., 1999); see also Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, ‘Global Civil Society’: A Sceptical View, in
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/5, at 26, 32 (Mary Kaldor et al. eds., 2005). Others, such as Richard Falk and
Andrew Strauss, refuse to accept this loss of public participation and argue for forms of global democracy.
Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of
Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 191, 193, 195 (2000). Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane attempt to
strike a middle ground, arguing that global democracy is unworkable but that international organizations are
subject to democratic checks through limits on delegated authority. Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane,
Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 32–33 (2005).
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participation by foreign publics in decisions by foreign governments or
international organizations affecting their populations is at least beneficial, if
not obligatory. The case for such participation is particularly strong in
situations in which the foreign government or international government has
jurisdiction and control over a local population—for example in a refugee
camp or detention facility—or where the local government is ineffectual and
the foreign government or international organization (whether acting through
contractors or directly) assumes a quasi-governmental role.114
Transparency is a second core value in the global administrative space.
Indeed, transparency can be conceptualized both as an end in itself and as a
central element of political participation and accountability because
transparency helps to maintain a feedback loop between government actors and
those affected by government policy, despite the fact that agency officials do
not themselves stand for election. In the United States, the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA),115 other sunshine laws,116 and whistleblower
protections117 help protect the value of transparency. In the foreign affairs
arena, these statutory frameworks balance the need for information to enable
informed public participation in decision-making with the countervailing need
for secrecy to protect national security.118 Scholars have suggested that
transparency protections in the transnational space are also critical to foster
dialogue and reasoned decision-making.119 This is because some international
organizations and less formal international associations are notoriously

114 See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 112, at 398–99 (detailing abuses by private military contractors and
aid workers in the context of West African refugee camps).
115 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012).
116 See, e.g., Georgia Open Meetings Law, GA. CODE ANN. § 50-14-1 (2013) (requiring state and local
government bodies to conduct their meetings so that the public can review and monitor elected officials).
117 See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465
(codified as amended in chapter 23 of 5 U.S.C.) (enhancing existing protections for federal employees who
disclose information related to agency misconduct).
118 For example, FOIA exempts matters that are “specifically authorized . . . by an Executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy” and are “properly classified” as such. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1)(A). In addition, the CIA, the National Security Agency, and a few other agencies are allowed to
exempt their working files from the search and review requirements of FOIA. Id. § 552(b)(1)–(7). Yet, despite
these exceptions, the statute has paved the way for the release of numerous documents that have shed light on
government security practices. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1055–56 (2008) (describing a variety of security-related
revelations that have emerged through FOIA requests).
119 See, e.g., Kingsbury et al., supra note 101, at 37–39.
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opaque,120 and transparency is therefore an important metric for evaluating
such entities.121
The final administrative law value is accountability, and so we must ask
whether, and to whom, agencies, institutions, or contractors are held
accountable. As I have written elsewhere, however, accountability, though
often invoked as a value, is rarely defined, particularly in the literature on
privatization.122 I have therefore suggested that we should disaggregate two
forms of accountability that are often muddled: accountability as redress and
accountability as managerial oversight.123
In the first form of accountability, an authoritative individual or entity
imposes a penalty if a person or organization has failed to comply with a
particular rule or standard.124 This form of accountability is essentially
backward-looking, involves a specific sanction, and occurs at a relatively
discrete moment in time (though it could have deterrent effects in the
future).125 When people speak of accountability, they often mean it in this
sense: the idea that there is somewhere to go after the fact to punish
wrongdoers and “hold them accountable.”126 Political scientists127 and
lawyers128 typically refer to accountability in this way.

120 For a discussion of the veiled practices of the Berne Union and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, see Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three
Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 202 n.318, 203 (2005).
121 See, e.g., Kingsbury et al., supra note 101, at 37–39.
122 Dickinson, supra note 106, at 104.
123 Id. at 103–04.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 104.
126 Id. at 103–04 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 See, e.g., Grant & Keohane, supra note 113, at 29 (“Accountability, as we use the term, implies that
some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their
responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities
have not been met.”). The authors distinguish accountability from other forms of constraint, noting that
accountability implies recognition of “the legitimacy of (1) the operative standards for accountability and (2)
the authority of the parties to the relationship.” Id. Moreover, they emphasize that accountability mechanisms
“always operate after the fact,” though even when they “operate ex post . . . [they] can exert effects ex ante.”
Id. at 30.
128 Administrative law scholar Jerry Mashaw also defines accountability in terms of redress. According to
Mashaw, accountability includes “six important things: who is liable or accountable to whom; what they are
liable to be called to account for; through what processes accountability is to be assured; by what standards
the putatively accountable behavior is to be judged; and, what the potential effects are of finding that those
standards have been breached.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on
the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115, 118
(Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). Mashaw’s definition gestures to a broad range of mechanisms and processes
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In the second form of accountability, an authoritative individual or entity
evaluates the performance of a person or organization and encourages that
person to observe a particular rule or standard. “This form of accountability is
essentially forward-looking, does not involve a particular sanction or penalty,
and is ongoing.”129 For example, when we commonly say that “elected
officials should be ‘held accountable’ by the electorate they represent or that a
supervisor holds her employees ‘accountable,’” we are invoking this second
form of accountability.130 “Here, accountability is not so much dependent on
courts, tribunals, and other grievance bodies meting out punishment after the
fact to redress specific infractions. Instead, managerial accountability entails
some form of ongoing scrutiny over those carrying out an activity to ensure
that those actors fulfill the purposes as specified.”131 Scholars and practitioners
from the fields of business, public management, or economics often refer to
accountability in this way.132
Both types of accountability are, I would suggest, critical in the global
space, and can be distinguished from the particular forms or mechanisms of
accountability that implement them.133 And both can be used as a measure of
an organization or entity’s respect for public values.
Turning from a focus on administrative law values, we must also analyze
the extent to which the ICoC regime conforms to core values of human dignity
embodied in international human rights and humanitarian law. Obviously, such
values are potentially threatened by security contractors who may use force
and may therefore injure or kill soldiers or civilians. For example, we need
look no further than the high-profile shootings in Baghdad’s Nisour Square in
2007, in which armed security guards from the private security firm
that various actors may use to implement accountability. But by focusing on judging behavior and an “effect”
or consequence, Mashaw’s definition implies a discrete moment of adjudication and some type of sanction.
129 Dickinson, supra note 106, at 103.
130 Id. at 104.
131 Id.
132 For example, Mark Moore, a professor of public management, focuses on what he terms “public
accountability,” which he defines as “a form of accountability that allows a collective to define its purposes
and then to develop the technical means for determining the degree to which those purposes have been
achieved.” Mark Moore, Introduction to Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1212, 1225 (2003). In Moore’s concept, the “public” nature of the accountability is the fact that the
collective has defined the purposes. Id. Determining whether a particular entity has performed those services is
essentially a question of monitoring and oversight. Id.
133 Dickinson, supra note 106, at 103 (“Such mechanisms may include, for example, litigation (criminal
or civil), contractual arrangements, political accountability—including the related issues of transparency and
participation—and institutional accountability based on the administrative and organizational structure and
culture of the relevant institutional actor.”).
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Blackwater, under contract with the U.S. State Department, fired into a crowd,
killing civilians.134 In addition, some firms may have engaged in practices that
amount to human trafficking or forced labor.135 Meanwhile, security company
employees themselves may also potentially be placed at risk in danger
zones.136 And discrimination, harassment, or mere negligence on the part of
company supervisors could infringe on employees’ human dignity as well.137
Because these risks could arise either during armed conflict—in which case
international humanitarian law would apply—or in peacetime—when
international human rights law would govern138—it is necessary to focus on the
values embodied in both bodies of law.
International human rights law and international humanitarian law protect
human dignity in multiple ways. For example, both bodies of law prohibit
certain acts, such as torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.139
Both bodies of law also limit killing or injuring others, though the standard
varies depending on the context. International human rights law prohibits such
acts except in the case of self-defense or as punishment for a crime after a fair
trial with all the incidents of due process.140 In contrast, during an armed
conflict international humanitarian law allows parties to intentionally kill or
injure combatants141 but prohibits intentional killing of civilians as well as
inflicting disproportionate harm to civilians while targeting combatants.142

134

James Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2007, at A1; David Johnston & John M. Broder, FBI Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1.
135 For an account of such practices committed by a broad array of military contractors (not merely
security firms), see Sarah Stillman, The Invisible Army, NEW YORKER, June 6, 2011, at 56.
136 Rod Nordland, War’s Risks Shift to Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1.
137 See Stillman, supra note 135, at 57.
138 Rosa Brooks, Protecting Rights in the Age of Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities, 36 GEO. J.
INT’L. L. 669, 674 (2005).
139 International human rights law prohibits torture most notably in the Torture Convention. Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The primary prohibition on torture during armed conflict
is contained within what is referred to as “common article three,” the shared article of all four Geneva
Conventions, which in turn articulate the primary framework for regulating warfare and limiting harm to
civilians during all forms of armed conflict. For one example of common article three, see Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6. U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, for the United States Feb. 2, 1956).
140 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (setting forth the right to life).
141 See MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND MATERIALS
433–39 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the Geneva Conventions and other international laws on the use of force).
142 Id.
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Again, while the standards vary, both bodies of law also limit the act of
detention.
International human rights law goes much further and provides for
additional protections. These protections include, for example, bans on various
forms of discrimination,143 as well as human trafficking,144 and forced labor.145
At the same time, human rights law also guards human dignity by articulating
numerous procedural due process rights in judicial proceedings.146
Finally, I should note that, when I invoke these core public values of
human dignity, participation, transparency, and accountability as benchmarks
to evaluate the proposed ICoC and its proposed oversight mechanism, I
recognize that some might object to labeling these values “public.” This is
because, over the past fifty years, many values and rights that were once
deemed public have been reframed or extended so that they apply well beyond
the traditionally public sphere. Thus, for example, drawing on legal realism,
many scholars and lawmakers in the civil rights era reconceived certain
antidiscrimination rights as belonging to individuals regardless of whether the
infringer was a policeman or a restauranteur.147 Accordingly, it might seem
anachronistic to try to privilege certain rights or values as quintessentially
public.
By using the term “public values,” however, I do not intend to reinscribe a
sharp or essential division between public and private spheres or to argue that
the values shift from sphere to sphere. On the contrary, the whole point of
regimes like the ICoC is to extend these public values so that they will apply to
private contractors acting at the behest of governments. Thus, it is my position
that the values remain core public values and that those values can and should
be applied, regardless of whether the actor in question is public or private.
143 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 26 (recognizing that all persons deserve equal protection before
the law).
144 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000,
T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.
145 See ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 8.3 (“No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory
labor.”); see also Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320
U.N.T.S. 291 (“[T]his Convention undertakes to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or
compulsory labour . . . .”).
146 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 140, arts. 9, 14 (preserving due process rights for all persons subject to
the Convention).
147 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: “State Action,” Equal
Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 86–91 (1967).
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B. The ICoC and Public Values
If we now turn to examine the ICoC and the governance mechanism in
light of these core public values, we can see that, at least at this preliminary
stage, they hold up quite well and show tremendous promise as a model of
public/private governance. Here, it is important to look both at the process by
which the regime was created and the substantive terms and structures of the
regime itself.
1. The Process of Creating the ICoC
One of the distinctive features of the ICoC and its accompanying
governance mechanism is how transparent and participatory the process of
their creation has been. Initiated during a series of workshops and conferences
in the spring of 2009, multiple stakeholders were present from the start.148
Representing governments, the Swiss, as discussed earlier, convened the
initiative,149 but representatives from the U.S. and British governments (two of
the largest employers of security contractors) were also involved up front.150
Representing civil society, Human Rights First and the Center for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) co-hosted a briefing in New
York in October 2009151 focused on identifying gaps in international law with
regard to security contractors and suggesting an important role for the Code.152
Meanwhile, a broad array of industry associations issued a declaration in
support of a code in June 2009, following a multi-stakeholder conference in
Nyon, Switzerland.153 Signed by Chris Grayling, of the Pan-African Security
Association; Doug Brooks, of the International Peace Operations Association
(now the International Stability Operations Association); and Andrew
Bearpark, of the British Association of Private Security Companies,154 the
Nyon Declaration asserts industry consensus on the need for a code of conduct:

148 See FACT SHEET, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that the ICoC process involved private security
companies, industry associations, governmental representatives, and various humanitarian and
nongovernmental organizations).
149 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Industry Statement from the Int’l Peace Operations Ass’n, British Ass’n of Private Sec. Cos., and Pan
African Sec. Ass’n (June 6, 2009), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/2009.06_-__Nyon_Declaration.pdf.
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[T]he industry representatives now present at the conference consider
it time to pursue and develop an international code of conduct for the
companies themselves in all situations.
Following a collective process involving pertinent stakeholders,
we have achieved a broad consensus that an international code of
conduct must be compliant with Human Rights and IHL. Further,
there is a clear necessity for effective oversight, accountability and
operational standards in such a code.
....
We see this process as an opportunity to enhance our ability to
address broader stakeholder concerns and to serve all our clients,
government and otherwise, in a transparent, professional and ethical
155
manner.

When it came to developing the specific provisions of the code of conduct,
again a broad array of groups participated. The first version of the Code,
released in January 2010, was initially drafted by the Swiss government along
with its partners, the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights (ADH) and DCAF.156 However, this draft was the product of a
“series of workshops and consultations with industry associations,
corporations, the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States,
other stakeholders and relevant experts.”157 Multiple stakeholders were given
the opportunity to comment on, and give input on, the draft.158 For example,
the U.S. Institute of Peace hosted a meeting in February 2010 for the purpose
of enabling civil society and humanitarian relief organizations to provide
comments.159 And, in an April 2010 meeting “to provide an update to
participants on the Draft Code,” participants included representatives from
governments and international organizations, practitioners with a security
background, nongovernmental clients of private security firms, civil society
groups (both those that employ security firms and those that seek a watchdog
role), and academics.160
The Code-writing process involved many drafts, with multiple
opportunities for diverse stakeholders to comment. For example, in the
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id.
ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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summer of 2010, the initial draft, which had been circulated widely and
discussed at multiple conferences and events, received thirty-seven written
comments spanning nearly two hundred pages.161 The second draft went
through a similarly rigorous process of evaluation and discussion in a series of
conferences and workshops.162 Some of these gatherings focused on specific
constituencies, such as a September 2010 meeting that “invited representatives
of the industry and governments, with the objective to explain the importance
of the Code to industry and allow them [to participate in] the drafting.”163 The
process culminated in a conference in Geneva in November 2010, at which the
final draft was adopted.164 Fifty-eight security companies signed the Code
immediately,165 and as of September 2013, there are 708 signatories,166 a truly
impressive degree of industry buy-in and participation.
The drafting process for the governance and oversight mechanism involved
a similarly broad array of stakeholders from government, industry, and civil
society.167 A steering committee, selected after the November 2010 conference
by each stakeholder group, supervised the project.168 Committee members
included representatives from industry, civil society, and government: from
industry, Mark DeWitt (Triple Canopy), Andrew Nicholson (Drum Cussac),
Brent Wegner (GardaWorld), and Sylvia White (Aegis); from civil society,
Chris Albin-Lackey (Human Rights Watch), Nils Melzer (Geneva Center for
Security Policy), Meg Roggensack (Human Rights First), and James Cockayne
(independent); from government, Josh Dorosin (U.S. Department of State),
David Dutton (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), and Paul
McGrade (U.K. Foreign Commonwealth Office).169 The steering committee
issued a work plan and time line, and then formed three working groups to
focus on the specific issues of (1) assessment, reporting, and internal and

161

Id.
Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Signatory Companies, INT’L
CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory_
Companies_-_September_2013_-_Composite_List-1.pdf [hereinafter ICoC Signatory Companies].
167 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.
168 Id.
169 ICoC Temporary Steering Committee (TSC), INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS,
http://www.icoc-psp.org/ICoC_Steering_Committee.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Steering
Committee].
162
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external oversight; (2) resolution of third party grievances; and (3) governance
mechanism structures and funding.170
The Steering Committee met regularly over the next two years, and, as in
the case of the Code itself, held multiple events allowing stakeholders to give
feedback.171 In addition, each working group consulted with experts and
provided the public with an opportunity to comment on the draft.172 Moreover,
significant changes were made, based on these comments.173 Final agreement
was reached on February 22, 2013, regarding the Charter for the oversight
mechanism.174 The next step is to establish this mechanism, which was
formally launched in Geneva in September of 2013,175 and to begin hiring
staff.
Despite this extensive, broad-based input, participation could perhaps have
been even wider. For example, the governments represented on the steering
committee for the oversight mechanism consisted entirely of Western,
developed countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia).176
Many leading host countries, such as Iraq, were notably absent, as were
countries from the developing world more generally. Industry representation
on the steering committee likewise consisted of companies headquartered in
the developed world.177 Although many large conferences and smaller
meetings were held, all were in Western, developed countries (Switzerland, the
United States, and the United Kingdom).178 A meeting in Africa, the Middle
East, Asia, or South America would likely have added a different mix of voices

170 Temp. Steering Comm. for the Int’l Code of Conduct for Private Sec. Serv. Providers, Work Plan,
INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS (May 11, 2011), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/
ICOCWorkPlan-final_11_May_2011.pdf [hereinafter Work Plan].
171 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.
172 FACT SHEET, supra note 12, at 2–4.
173 See Comments on the Draft Charter, INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS,
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Comments_Draft_Charter_ICoC.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2013).
174 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers—Consensus on Oversight
Mechanism, SWITZ. FED. DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/recent/
media/single.html?id=47889.
175 About the ICoC Association, supra note 17.
176 See ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.
177 Triple Canopy has its headquarters in the United States, Locations, TRIPLE CANOPY, http://www.
triplecanopy.com/company/locations/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2013), the headquarters of Aegis and Drum Cussac
are located in the United Kingdom, Contact, AEGIS, http://www.aegisworld.com/contact (last visited Dec. 13,
2013); Global Presence, DRUM CUSSAC, http://www.drum-cussac.com/globalpresence.aspx (last visited Dec.
13, 2013), and Garda Global is headquartered in Canada, Locations, GW, http://www.garda-world.com/
locations (last visited Dec. 13, 2013).
178 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.
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and perspectives. In addition, private clients of security firms—often large,
multinational corporations such as those in the extractive industries—were
mostly absent from the process. Although at least one meeting apparently
included such corporations,179 the primary conceptualization and drafting of
the Code and oversight mechanism were undertaken by others, despite the fact
that these corporations will likely be major employers of private contractors
subject to the Code, and they could also ultimately help fund the oversight
regime. Accordingly, greater involvement from this group would likely have
been beneficial.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that participation overall in the
development of the Code and oversight mechanism was extraordinarily broad.
Multiple stakeholder groups jointly led the initiative at every turn.180 And
while only Western, developed countries served on the steering committee,
these countries are, in practice, the leading governmental clients for security
firms. Although industry representation on the steering committee was
similarly skewed, the companies that have now signed the Code are much
more diverse, with headquarters on five continents.181 Moreover, there were at
least two meetings designed to reach out to an even broader array of firms,182
and the adoption of the Code was delayed for several months in part to enable
African firms to evaluate the Code at the annual conference of African security
firms.183 By holding numerous conferences, workshops, and informal
discussions with a wide range of groups and individuals, the convenors
ensured broad input.
The process was also strikingly transparent. The convenors established a
public website with news of meetings and workshops.184 On the website, they
provided the agendas for many of these events,185 as well as relevant

179

Id.
See FACT SHEET, supra note 12, at 2 (noting the various categories of actors involved in the process).
181 See INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-psp.org/Home_Page.
html (last visited Dec. 13, 2013) [hereinafter ICoC Homepage] (providing a map of contractor headquarters by
country).
182 See ICoC Timeline, supra note 14 (meetings in September 2010 in London and Washington, D.C.).
183 See, e.g., Discussion Document, Meeting for Finalizing Code of Conduct (Sept. 29–30, 2010),
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/2010.09.29_-_Geneva.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2013).
184 See ICoC Homepage, supra note 181.
185 See, e.g., Workshop Agenda, Ctr. for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Towards an
International PMSC Code of Conduct (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/2009.04.19__Agenda_CoC_Workshop_II_Geneva.pdf.
180
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documents such as concept papers.186 For steering committee meetings, they
provided the time line for,187 and agendas and minutes from, each meeting.188
In addition, they developed and published the steering committee’s internal
rules and procedures,189 as well as guidelines for the working groups.190 And
the steering committee published a detailed plan of work and time frame for
that plan.191
Particularly noteworthy is what amounted to a public notice-and-comment
process for both the Code and the Charter regarding the oversight mechanism.
In both cases, the convenors circulated multiple drafts via e-mail to
stakeholders and, in addition, posted the drafts on the website.192 In addition,
the convenors gave the public the opportunity to provide written comments, as
well as more informal input at various meetings, workshops, and
conferences.193 These comments—including comments from thirty-seven
entities responding to the draft Code,194 and from forty entities responding to
the draft Charter195—are publicly available on the website. In the case of the
Charter, the Temporary Steering Committee provided not only the comments
but an account of the Committee’s response to each comment as reflected in
the second draft of the Charter.196
Thus, it is difficult to imagine a substantially more transparent process for
developing the Code and Charter. Perhaps the convenors could have provided
information identifying the individuals and entities in attendance at the various
meetings. In some cases, as for the temporary steering committee meetings, the

186

See, e.g., Concept Paper: Areas Requiring Further Consideration for the ICoC, INT’L CODE CONDUCT
PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/TSC_Concept_Paper-final_2011May.pdf
(last visited Dec. 13, 2013).
187 Steering Committee, supra note 169.
188 See, e.g., Minutes, Temporary Steering Committee Meeting (Jan. 16–18, 2013), http://www.icocpsp.org/uploads/2013.01.16_-_Minutes_TSC.pdf.
189 THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS (ICOC)
FRAMEWORK FOR THE STEERING COMMITTEE (2011), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Steering_
Committee_Rules_-_Final.pdf.
190 Guidance on Working Groups, INT’L CODE CONDUCT FOR PRIV. SEC. SERV. PROVIDERS,
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_TSC_Working_Group_Guidelines_05-04-2011_-__Final.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 13, 2013).
191 Work Plan, supra note 170.
192 ICoC Timeline, supra note 14.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Comments on the Draft Charter, supra note 173.
196 Id.
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minutes do identify the participants.197 In other cases, the website might
provide the agenda for, and speakers at, a meeting without identifying the
stakeholder participants.198 But these are minor criticisms. Overall, the process
has been a model of transparency and inclusion.
Indeed, with respect to both transparency and participation, the process for
drafting the Code and Charter fares as well as, if not better than, domestic
rulemaking. For example, the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-andcomment requirements mandate that agencies provide notice of proposed
rulemaking and give the interested public time to comment.199 As we have
seen, during the process to draft the Code and Charter, the convenors likewise
provided both adequate notice and ample opportunity to comment.200 Indeed,
the convenors went further than domestic rulemaking, which does not in all
cases require that public meetings be held.201 And the process far exceeded
what foreign policy agencies such as the Department of Defense and State
Department typically provide.202 Though little discussed, these agencies do
engage in some rulemaking that falls within at least broad contours of the
APA.203 But in many cases these agencies do not follow the procedures
scrupulously,204 and it is unclear how many rules the agencies decline to

197 See, e.g., Minutes, Temporary Steering Committee Meeting (Nov. 28–30, 2012), http://www.icocpsp.org/uploads/2012.11.28-_Activities_TSC_November.pdf (identifying participants at the meeting).
198 See, e.g., Workshop Agenda, Ctr. for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Towards an
International PMSC Code of Conduct (May 8, 2009), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/2009.05.08__Agenda_CoC_Workshop_III_Geneva.pdf.
199 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). Thus, under the primary default procedures contained in § 553(b)(3) of the
APA, an agency must first provide public notice of any contemplated rulemaking activity by publishing, in the
Federal Register, “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved.” Next, under § 553(c), the agency must offer interested persons an opportunity to participate through
the submission of written comments. Unlike some of the legislative proposals that Congress rejected, the APA
does not require the agency to hold a public hearing. Then, upon issuing a final rule, the agency must include a
“concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose.” Id. Because courts have relied on legislative
history that suggests Congress wanted this statement to explain the final regulations, preambles to final rules
“tend to be more comprehensive than concise, including detailed discussions of the regulations’ goals and
methods, negative comments received, and the agency’s responses thereto.” Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring
Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act
Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1733 (2007).
200 See supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text.
201 See discussion supra note 199.
202 Laura A. Dickinson, Administrative Law and the Foreign Policy Agencies (2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); see also David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187
(2010).
203 See Dickinson, supra note 202.
204 Id. Indeed, even other agencies such as the Treasury Department fail to follow the notice-and-comment
procedures scrupulously. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 199, at 1730.
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submit to the process altogether, as there are broad exemptions for military and
foreign policy functions.205 Moreover, according to empirical studies, even
when agencies follow the procedural requirements of the APA to the letter,
public participation in rulemaking through the notice-and-comment process
often has minimal impact on substantive rules.206 In contrast, as discussed
above, the comments on the Code and Charter resulted in significant changes
to the regime.207
The opportunity for the public to participate and the transparency of the
process were also arguably greater than in many treaty-drafting initiatives.
Because treaties are agreements between and among states, civil society
organizations and industry groups often do not have a seat at the negotiating
table, even though they may be allowed to sit in and comment on some aspects
of the proceedings.208 Moreover, what goes on inside the negotiating room is
often secret. Here, not only did civil society organizations and industry groups
participate in public conferences to discuss drafts, they actually helped direct
the process.
2. The ICoC’s Substantive Provisions
The regime also fares well if measured for its normative commitment to
human dignity, public participation, transparency, and accountability.
a. Human Dignity
As described above, the Code provides a robust set of protections regarding
human dignity.209 It offers clear, specific, and detailed articulations of multiple
critical norms.210 And it explicitly applies international human rights law and
international humanitarian law to contractors,211 even though contractors often
205

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012).
See Hickman, supra note 199; Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The SausageMaking of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 58 (2013). Public participation through the notice-andcomment process is more likely to have an impact if those advocating for a particular change to a rule have a
concentrated interest. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 109, at 51.
207 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
208 To be sure, some scholars have critiqued such broad-based participation as antidemocratic. The
argument is that only official governmental representatives, selected or appointed through official democratic
processes, can legitimately speak for a polity. To allow other groups a seat at the table could undermine the
democratic framework.
209 See supra notes 18–30 and accompanying text.
210 See ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 30.
211 See id. ¶ 3.
206
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occupy a gray area in the international instruments themselves.212 Furthermore,
in contested areas such as defining torture, the Code takes an aggressive
approach.213 If the oversight and enforcement mechanisms end up having teeth,
then there is little doubt that the Code would be a huge step forward in
extending core norms of human dignity to the entire security contractor
industry.
b. Public Participation
The regime also provides significant opportunities for participation from
multiple stakeholders. First, the Board itself is composed of members from
each stakeholder group (civil society, industry, and government).214 Each
group is equally represented and has the responsibility of electing its particular
Board members.215 Moreover, the voting structure ensures that no voting block
formed by two stakeholder groups can push through policy over the objection
of the third.216 This is because decisions are made by a majority vote of at least
eight Board members, but in addition at least two Board members from each
stakeholder group must support the decision.217 While this provision could lead
to a stalemate, it ensures that the development of the Code and its oversight
mechanism continues to have support from government, industry, and human
rights NGOs.
In addition, beyond the Board, there are opportunities for broad
participation. At regular meetings, the regime offers members from each
stakeholder group the chance to consult with one another, the Board, and the
Secretariat.218 To date, industry representation is extraordinarily extensive,
including 708 companies from 79 countries and territories on 5 continents.219 It
still remains to be seen how many governments will be involved in the regime,
and how broad civil society representation will be. But unlike the process for
drafting the Code and the Charter, where non-Western countries and NGOs
were not particularly involved,220 the regime in operation contemplates no

212
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214
215
216
217
218
219
220

See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
See ICOC, supra note 10, ¶¶ 35–37.
ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 3.1.
Id. art. 7.2.
Id. art. 7.6.
Id.
Id. art. 6.2.
ICoC Signatory Companies, supra note 166.
See supra 171–79 and accompanying text.
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limits regarding the participation of such governments and civil society
groups.221
As noted above, one key stakeholder group that does not yet have a clear
seat at the table in the regime is the group of corporations, such as those in the
extraction industries, that regularly employ private security contractors. These
corporations do not have a role in the regime comparable to the three primary
stakeholder groups.222 Nevertheless, the Charter does provide that the Board
may adopt rules to grant “observer status” to other stakeholder groups, and
specifically mentions “non-state clients,” as one such group.223 Thus, such
entities can at least have a role in the process, albeit a less central one. In any
event, the broad participation agreement contemplated by the ICoC is a model
of multi-stakeholder deliberation and involvement.
c. Transparency
The regime is also extraordinarily transparent, particularly when compared
to the opaque quality of many multilateral transnational agreements. This
transparency has two components: first, the ICoC imposes significant
transparency requirements on its members;224 and, second, the Association’s
own processes are designed to remain reasonably transparent.225
To become members of the Association administering the ICoC,
governments and international organizations must agree to comply with the
Montreux process, which requires them to “commit to provide information
related to their implementation of the Montreux Document and the Code,
including the development of their domestic regulatory framework for PSC
activities.”226 Thus, such governments will need to publicly disclose their
progress (or lack thereof) in developing domestic regulatory structures for the
security contractor industry.
For their part, civil society groups wishing to participate will need to
demonstrate that they have a strong record of promoting international human
221

See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 3.1.
See id. (establishing three stakeholder pillars, none of which are dedicated to such corporations).
223 Id. art. 3.4.
224 See ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 53 (requiring signatory companies to maintain records for seven years and
mandating access to such records unless impermissible by law).
225 See, e.g., ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, arts. 9.3, 10.1 (designating the Secretariat as
being responsible for maintaining all records and establishing an advisory forum open to all participants
regardless of membership status).
226 Id. art. 3.3.2.
222
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rights or humanitarian law and that they operate independent from both
government and industry.227 This provision helps ensure that the civil society
groups involved are true watchdogs and not mere fronts for government or
industry masquerading as NGOs. Such independent monitoring aids
transparency because these groups, if they are truly independent, are far more
reliable whistleblowers should the ICoC or its oversight mechanism begin to
devolve into something ineffective.
Finally, the contractor firms, to be certified under the ICoC, must issue a
“written, public declaration of their intent to adhere to the Code,”228 as well as
provide evidence to the Board that supports the declaration.229 As part of their
compliance, these firms must publish grievance procedures on their
websites,230 and “undertake to be transparent regarding their progress towards
implementing the Code’s principles.”231 Most importantly, as noted above,
certified firms are subject to robust reporting requirements concerning use-offorce incidents,232 internal oversight procedures,233 and mechanisms for
addressing grievances.234 These reports can form the basis for a far more
transparent system for addressing potential problems related to private security
contractors than has been the norm so far.
As to the Association’s own processes, the ICoC requires the group to
develop procedures for certification,235 performance assessment,236 and
facilitation of grievances.237 It is anticipated that these procedures will be
public, providing transparent criteria for performance assessment.238 In
addition, after undertaking a performance assessment of a particular company,
“the Board may issue a public statement on the status or outcome of the
Association’s review of a Member company.”239 And, with regard to grievance
procedures, the Board is expected to publish public “guidance to Members on
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Id. art. 3.3.3.
Id. art. 11.2.3.
Id. art. 11.2.1–.2.
ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 67(b).
Id. ¶ 8.
See id. ¶ 37.
See id. ¶ 6(d) (requiring members to establish and maintain an internal governance framework).
See id. ¶ 66.
See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 11.1.
See id. art. 12.
See id. art. 13.
Id. art. 12.2.2.
Id. art. 12.2.9.
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best practice and compliance”240 with requirements involving their obligation
to establish fair and accessible internal grievance procedures,241 publish them
on a website,242 investigate claims promptly,243 keep records,244 cooperate with
parallel investigations,245 take disciplinary action,246 and provide whistleblower
protections.247
Finally, “[t]he Association will report publicly, no less than annually, on its
activities” pertaining to reporting, monitoring, and performance assessment.248
Moreover, as an independent legal entity with legal capacity governed by
Swiss law,249 the Association may have additional transparency requirements
as provided by Swiss law. The Swiss government will also publicly list all
signatory companies.250 This combination of provisions ensures a striking
degree of transparency, both with regard to the crucial activities of the private
security firms and the governance process itself.
d. Accountability
As discussed previously, accountability encompasses both managerial
accountability, which involves creating institutional and organizational
structures that embed accountability in a forward-looking manner, and
accountability as redress, which looks to after-the-fact punishment
mechanisms.251 Here, I discuss the ways that the ICoC and Charter feature both
forms of accountability.
i. Managerial Accountability
The certification requirements impose some forms of managerial
accountability. Participating firms must certify that they meet the Code
obligations, which require the company to have internal managerial controls to

240
241
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245
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247
248
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See id. art. 13.3.
See id. art. 13.1.
ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 67(b).
Id. ¶ 67(c).
Id. ¶ 67(d).
Id. ¶ 67(e).
Id. ¶ 67(f).
Id. ¶ 67(g).
ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 12.3.
Id. art. 1.1.
ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 70.
See supra notes 122–32 and accompanying text.
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ensure compliance.252 Signatory companies commit “to take steps to establish
and maintain an effective internal governance framework in order to deter,
monitor, report, and effectively address adverse impacts on human rights.”253
In addition, companies agree “to establish and/or demonstrate internal
processes to meet the requirements of the Code’s principles and the standards
derived from the Code.”254
Meanwhile, the Association and Board agree to “[e]stablish external
independent mechanisms for effective governance and oversight, which will
include Certification . . . , Auditing[,] and Monitoring of [the companies’]
work in the field.”255 Significantly, such ongoing auditing and performance
assessment will be conducted by outside entities,256 which is likely to affect
significantly the internal governance and accountability mechanisms of the
firms. Indeed, auditing is defined as
a process through which independent auditors, accredited by the
governance and oversight mechanism, conduct on-site audits,
including in the field, on a periodic basis, gathering data to be
reported to the governance and oversight mechanism which will in
turn verify whether a Company is meeting requirements and if not,
257
what remediation may be required.

Finally, the Charter also requires ongoing monitoring and performance
assessment by the Board and Association itself. Thus, companies need to
provide regular written self-assessments to the Board and Association,258 and
“[t]he Association shall be responsible for exercising oversight of Member
companies’ performance under the Code, including through external
monitoring, reporting and a process to address alleged violations of the
code.”259 Moreover, if the Association is concerned about a firm’s compliance,
field missions may be authorized,260 and the Secretariat shall review
information obtained and engage in dialogue with the firm regarding possible
reforms.261 The Board can also intervene and conduct reviews of firms, either
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ICOC, supra note 10, ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 6(d).
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 7(b).
Id.
Id. § B.
ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, art. 12.2.2.
Id. art. 12.1.
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on the recommendation of the Executive Director or on its own initiative.262
The Board can also request corrective action and can ultimately suspend a firm
or terminate its membership,263 which may make it more difficult for the firm
to obtain future contracts.
ii. Accountability as Redress
As described previously, the Code creates a series of procedures by which
use of force and other questionable incidents are reported, investigated, and
adjudicated.264 First, signatory companies are required to report all incidents
involving the use of a weapon.265 This report is submitted to the client and
competent authorities, though as of yet it is unclear whether the Association or
Board will also receive a copy.266 In addition, companies must establish an
internal grievance process that is fair, accessible, and offers effective
remedies.267 They must publish details of their procedures, investigate
allegations promptly, keep records of the investigations, cooperate with official
investigations, take appropriate disciplinary action, and provide whistleblower
protections.268 This is a far more robust set of accountability mechanisms than
exists currently with regard to private security contractors.
The Association itself is also empowered to take steps to “support Member
companies” in their obligations under the Code to resolve grievances through
their internal mechanisms.269 Thus, the Secretariat can receive claims from
company personnel and third parties.270 The Secretariat can then communicate
with claimants regarding available grievance procedures.271 If a claimant
alleges that a company’s procedure is not fair, not accessible, or does not offer
an effective remedy, the Secretariat can review that allegation.272 After such a
review, the Secretariat enters a dialogue with the company, and if the
grievance process is deemed inadequate, the Secretariat can recommend
corrective action and/or suggest referral to another “fair and accessible
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grievance procedure that may offer an effective remedy.”273 For its part, the
Board may request referral, which could “include cooperation with the
Association’s good offices, the provision of a neutral and confidential
mediation process, or other arrangements that may assist the Member company
to offer an effective remedy.”274 And of course, as previously mentioned, if a
company does not cooperate sufficiently, the Board can impose sanctions or
suspend the company’s certification.275
Thus, the regime, while not itself subjecting noncompliant contractors to
formal civil or criminal sanctions, has far more robust compliance and
accountability mechanisms than many other voluntary industry-driven codes of
conduct. Significantly, much of the monitoring is from independent outside
entities, and the ultimate sanction of banishment from the regime may render
firms ineligible to receive lucrative contracts, particularly if governments agree
only to hire certified security contractors.
CONCLUSION
Of course, the governance and oversight mechanism for the ICoC, while
formally launched in September 2013, is not yet fully operational. Much will
ultimately depend on how the various compliance and grievance procedures
are implemented and enforced. It is certainly possible that the opportunity will
be lost, and the Code provisions will become mere paper aspirations. Further
review will obviously be necessary.
However, many of the components are in place for a relatively robust
public/private oversight regime. Most importantly, the ICoC is a true
public/private partnership; it is not just industry self-regulation. Both the
process for drafting the Code and Charter and the ongoing Board structure
ensure that governments and human rights NGOs remain at the table, which
will presumably help ensure the Code is implemented with the serious
compliance energy originally envisioned.
Thus, in a world fraught with violence and the possibility for abuse, where
oversight has been virtually nonexistent, we now see emerging a true effort to
demand accountability. Developed in a comparatively quick, transparent, and
participatory process, a mechanism is emerging that has the chance to provide
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real oversight and encourage institutional reform of an industry that has been
difficult to tame through the classic means of international and domestic law.
This in itself is an important advance, and it also suggests a roadmap for other
public/private governance and oversight partnerships that might be considered
in the future.

